Active monitoring and introspection appears to be distinct from perceptual phenomena such as sight. Previous brain imaging studies relied on introspection as measures of perceptual alterations.
"Despite viewing passively, it is likely that participants upregulated and downregulated the degree to which they monitored their own perceptual state. Periods of increased self-monitoring would then be associated with increased frontoparietal activity. Such endogenous upregulation of self-monitoring would also enhance activity in visual areas. This simultaneous modulation, even if unrelated to perceptual-transition events, could yield the observed correlations. This interpretation is supported by the role of early visual areas in representing ambiguous stimuli (Polonsky et al., 2000; Tong, 2003; Lee et al., 2005; Meng et al., 2005), which suggests that activity related to rivalry transitions should then also correlate with V1, contrary to Lumer and Rees' observations. Wilcke et al. (2009) had observers passively watch rivalry stimuli and used binocular fusion (rather than permanent suppression) as a control, excluding task-difficulty differences between replay and rivalry (O'Shea and Corballis, 2005). They identified frontal, parietal, occipital, and limbic areas for the processing of ambiguous stimuli without report, consistent with a separate active-report experiment. However, their design precluded time-locked analysis of switching for passive viewing, rendering any conclusion about a driving (versus monitoring) role of frontal regions impossible."
hallucinogens increase introspection and positive mood by modulating brain activity in the fronto-temporo-parieto-occipital cortex https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.026
"The second hypothesis stems from the consistent evidence that DMN activity is also re- duced during meditative states [13,17,44]. In fact, psychedelics and meditation share many psychological features. For instance, both conditions increase introspection, self-perception, and affect mind-wandering [1,11,45]. Meditation has been described as “the practice of resting your attention on whatever is going through your mind, without the attempt of interfering or attaching to the stream of thoughts and emotions” . Decreased DMN activity during medi- tation has been linked to a decrease in mind-wandering . This should not be the case with psychedelics, as experienced users show potentiated mind-wandering . On the other hand, the awareness of mind-wandering is altered in both states. A recent study suggests that DMN activity increases during periods of mind-wandering, but decreases with the awareness that the mind has wandered , and this could be just the case of the Ayahuasca experience. It is as ifthese experiences lead to a change of standpoint, shifting one’s perspective from actor to an attentive spectator." 10.1371/journal.pone.0118143
Introspection is not equally related to all Key Competencies for Sustainable Consumption (KCSCs).
"Contrary to the assumptions of early psychology, vast research now points out that we do not have automatic or unbiased access to our own experience (Wilson, 2004). In other words, introspection can be more or less accurate, which implies that there is some sort of introspective ability determining the extent and quality with which subjective experience is observed. Investigating upon this ability, however, poses an unavoidable problem, namely that “it is impossible to directly assess the contents of experience” (Schooler and Schreiber, 2004, p. 17), as these are exclusively accessible to the experiencing subject. When inquiring peoples’ introspection, researchers must instead rely on peoples’ verbal reports on their experiences. As Schooler and Schreiber emphasize, talking about introspective observation does not only require the subject to consciously experience something (experiential consciousness) but also presupposes an awareness of making the experience (meta- awareness). Against this backdrop, the authors define introspection as the conscious observation of subjective experience while knowing that one is making this experience. The ability to introspect can then be defined as the ability to consciously observe subjective"
There's a Wurzburg School research methodology for dialogic introspection https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42087-018-0027-5 https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1027/1016-9040/a000329
"Brodmann area 46d (BA46d) played a critical role in supporting metacognition independent of task performance; we also found that the critical role of this region in meta-calculation was time-sensitive. Additionally, we report that macaque metacognition is highly domain-specific with respect to memory and perception decisions. These findings carry implications for our understanding of metacognitive introspection within the primate lineage." https://doi.org/10.1038/s42003-022-03762-6
Thinking outloud is task-oriented and verbalization doesn't really capture introspective abilities. https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21355633/
depressed patients are able to down-regulate amygdala activity by emotion-introspection. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925492717303396